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Preferences for Enhancement Pharmaceuticals:
The Reluctance to Enhance Fundamental Traits
JASON RIIS
JOSEPH P. SIMMONS
GEOFFREY P. GOODWIN*
Four studies examined the willingness of young, healthy individuals to take drugs
intended to enhance their own social, emotional, and cognitive traits. We found
that people were much more reluctant to enhance traits believed to be more fundamental to self-identity (e.g., social comfort) than traits considered less fundamental to self-identity (e.g., concentration ability). Moral acceptability of a trait
enhancement strongly predicted people's desire to legalize the enhancement but
not their willingness to take the enhancement. Ad taglines that framed enhancements as enabling rather than enhancing the fundamental self increased people's
interest in a fundamental trait enhancement and eliminated the preference for less
fundamental over more fundamental trait enhancements.

A

dvances in medical technology are providing people
with increasingly powerful ways to improve themselves. These technologies are not just used to restore health
and youth, as increasing numbers of healthy young people
are using them as well. More than a million young men
have taken steroids to improve their strength and physical
appearance (National Institute of Drug Abuse 2007), and
millions of young women have taken weight loss drugs
(Khan et al. 2001) or have undergone surgical breast enlargement or rhinoplasty (American Society of Plastic Surgeons 2005). In addition to these cosmetic technologies,
many healthy young people take stimulants like Ritalin and
Adderall to improve cognitive performance and antidepres-

sants to lift mood and reduce anxiety, even in the absence
of any disorder or deficit (Elliott 2003; McCabe et al. 2005).
The aim of this article is to exaruine the willingness of
young, healthy individuals to take drugs intended to produce
psychological enhancements.
The biotechnology boom has many scientists and clinicians optimistic that dramatic improvements in the effectiveness and safety of such pharmaceuticals are imminent.
While such improvements will undoubtedly help clinical
populations, they are also very likely to increase demand
for these enhancements among nonclinical populations.
Concern about such demand has sparked considerable public
debate, including the publication of a report by the President's Council on Bioethics (2003). But there is little research attempting to understand the psychology underlying
the demand for such enhancement pharmaceuticals. In what
ways are healthy young people willing to enhance their
psychological abilities? Will some psychological enhancements be more popular and less stigmatized than others?
The present research begins to address these questions.
We suggest that people's willingness to take psychological enhancements will largely depend on beliefs about
whether those enhancements will alter characteristics considered fundamental to self-identity. Especially in Western
cultures, the belief in a fundamental, essential self is widespread (Markus and Kitayama 1991). People believe that
particular stable traits explain much of a person's behavior
and that these traits form a person's essential self or soul
(Chen, Boucher, and Tapias 2006; Dweck 1999; Haslam,
Bastian, and Bissett 2004; Markus 1977). Moreover, people
are highly motivated to express their self-identities, often
through consumption experiences (Aaker 1999; Belk 1988;
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Berger and Heath 2007; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; Shavitt, Lowrey, and Han 1992; Vazire and Gosling 2004). They
are also highly motivated to maintain a consistent and stable
self-identity and will reject information that challenges this
self-identity (Swann 1987; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler 1992). In this light, we propose that people will be especially reluctant to artificially enhance themselves in ways
that are believed to alter their fundamental selves.

THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENTS
Although bioethicists have been discussing the implications of human enhancement for decades, the discussion has
gained momentum with the recognition that many drugs
already on the market are being used by nonclinical populations to make themselves perform and feel better (Bailey
2005; Caplan 2007; Elliott 2003; Fukuyama 2002; Gazzaniga 2005; Green 2007; Hughes 2004; Sandel 2007). Indeed,
many drugs offer potential benefits to nonclinical populations. For example, there are several drugs that can improve
cognitive abilities such as intelligence, concentration, learning, and memory. Several studies have shown that Ritalin,
the drug used to treat attention deficit disorder, can improve
performance on basic problem-solving tasks that require
high levels of concentration (Elliott et al. 1997; Mehta et
al. 2000). Gazzaniga (2005) estimates that Ritalin can improve the SAT scores of children without attention deficit
disorder by 100 points or more. And, indeed, many college
students are aware of Ritalin's effectiveness. One study estimated that as many as 16% of college students have used
it as a study aid, often illegally using pills prescribed for
someone else (Babcock and Byrne 2000).
There is also ongoing research to develop drugs to treat
memory loss in patients with Alzheimer's disease. Nobel
laureate Eric Kandel has formed a company, Memory Pharmaceuticals, that uses his basic research on memory and
learning to develop commercially viable compounds. One
such drug, donepezil, is already on the market and is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to treat
memory loss. Indeed, one study found that pilots who took
donepezil just before learning specific maneuvers in a flight
simulator outperformed a control group on tests of performance conducted I month later (Yesavage et al. 2002).
Social and emotional traits can also be altered in nonclinical populations. Antidepressants known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) have been used to treat
a variety of mental illnesses, including depression and anxiety disorders. However, Knutson et al. (1998) found that
these drugs can reduce negative affect and increase outgoingness in healthy adults, and Kramer (1993) suggests
that many nondepressed people in fact use them for this
purpose. Similarly, beta-blockers, originally used for the
treatruent of hypertension and other cardiac conditions, are
widely used by stage performers and public speakers to
reduce performance anxiety (Jefferson 1996). SSRIs have
limited effectiveness, and beta-blockers are dangerous, but

there are many ongoing research programs investigating
compounds that will more safely and effectively allow people to regulate their emotions and improve their social skills
(Barondes 2003; NeuroInsights 2006).

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
ENHANCEMENT
Michael Gazzaniga (2005), former president of the Association for Psychological Science, has suggested that the
intelligence advantage gained from taking pharmaceuticals
is not ethically any different from the intelligence advantages that some people already get from their genes or from
money spent on a good education. On the other hand, the
bioethicist Leon Kass (2004), former chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, has called enhancement "dehumanizing," invoking references to Aldous Huxley's Brave
New World.
While the bioethics debate is very active, little is known
about the psychology underlying consumer demand for such
pharmaceuticals. In one of the first investigations of this
issue, Baron and Spranca (1997) found a strong resistance
to the legalization of IQ enhancements for children with
normal intelligence, and many people felt that they should
not be allowed no matter what the social benefits might be.
Similarly, Sabini and Monterosso (2003, 2005) found that
although people were somewhat tolerant of allowing memory- and attention-enhancing drugs for performers in the
bottom 10%, few thought that average or high achievers
should be allowed to use them. Although these studies suggest conditions under which people may be unlikely to support legalizing particular enhancements, neither study examined people's interest in taking the drugs themselves or
the factors associated with such interest. Indeed, concerns
about fairness may be quite disconnected from individuals'
own enhancement preferences.
Carl Elliott's (2003) book, Better than Well, describes the
use of several enhancement technologies (both surgical and
pharmaceutical), including sex change surgeries, steroids,
and antidepressants. Although Elliott was sympathetic to the
potential benefits that such technologies may offer, he also
expressed some misgivings about these technologies, suggesting that identities should not be tampered with: "What
is worrying about so-called 'enhancement technologies'
may not be the prospect of improvement but the more basic
fact of altering oneself, of changing capacities and characteristics fundamental to one's identity.. . . Much deeper
questions seem to be at issue when we talk about changing
a person's identity, the very core of what that person is.
Making him smarter, giving him a different personality or
even giving him a new face-these things cut much closer
to the bone. . . . They mean, in some sense, transforming
him into a new person" (Elliott 1999, 28-29; also cited by
DeGrazia 2005).
The President's Council on Bioethics (2003) expresses
this concern even more strongly: "In seeking by these [biotechnologies] to be better than we are or to like ourselves
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better than we do, we risk 'turning into someone else,' confounding the identity we have acquired through natural gift
cultivated by genuinely lived experiences" (300).
These passages reflect the authors' beliefs that (1) people
have a fundamental self-identity and (2) tampering with this
self-identity may be unpalatable. These two beliefs are consistent with much research on the psychology of the self.
Although people are certainly willing to present themselves
differently depending on situational contexts (Aaker 1999;
Schlenker and Weigold 1989), it is clear that most people
do see their core identities as being largely stable and consistent. Indeed, Markus (1977) suggested that people have
"self-schemata" that capture the consistencies that they see
in themselves. And, Swann (1987) and Swann et al. (1992)
have shown that people seek verification of these consistencies in the feedback they get from others, suggesting that
they maintain and value their own self-identity.
What has received less attention in the literature is that
some individual characteristics are generally seen as more
fundamental to self-identity than are others. Many people
have the belief that physical characteristics (like height and
hair color) are less fundamental to self-identity than are
mental characteristics (like intelligence and outgoingness).
But Haslam and colleagues (2004) have shown that there
is variance even among mental characteristics, as some are
believed to be more fundamental to self-identity than others.
In particular, they found that people are more likely to consider emotional mental characteristics to be more "deeply
rooted" aspects of self-identity. Because people desire to
express and preserve their own self-identities, we suggest
that people will be most reluctant to enhance such fundamental, deeply rooted characteristics of the self.
In the studies that follow, we examine whether the welldocumented concern for the preservation of self-identity
affects the willingness of young, healthy individuals to take
drugs designed to improve their own social, emotional, and
cognitive abilities. We expected such individuals to share
the misgivings of the President's Council on Bioethics
(2003, quoted above) and to resist tampering with their own
self-identities. That is, we expected people to be less willing
to enhance the more fundamental aspects of themselves,
despite recognizing that such enhancements would make life
better.

RESEARCH OVERVIEW
We present four studies investigating the determinants of
people's willingness to take psychological enhancements.
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that healthy young people are
more reluctant to enhance traits that are believed to be fundamental aspects of their self-identities than traits that are
believed to be less fundamental. Study 3 demonstrates that
attitudes toward banning pharmaceutical enhancements are
not driven by the same concerns that lead individuals to
resist enhancements. Specifically, study 3 shows that the
desire to restrict legal access to these enhancements is driven
primarily by morality concerns, whereas the reluctance to
take enhancements oneself is driven primarily by identity

concerns. Finally, in study 4, we explore the implications
of our findings for advertising and regulation. Direct-toconsumer advertising of psychoactive pharmaceuticals has
been controversial, with some authors suggesting that pharmaceutical companies purposefully reach out to nonclinical
populations with their advertisements (Healy 2004). And
there is evidence that nonclinical populations can easily get
prescriptions for drugs like antidepressants from family
physicians (Kravitz et al. 2005) and from online pharmacies (Forman and Block 2006). We inform this debate by
investigating whether advertisements that frame enhancements as enablers of the self can disarm the self-identity
concerns that would otherwise prevent nonclinical individuals from enhancing fundamental traits. All stakeholder
groups (patients, physicians, policy makers, industry) have
an interest in understanding how people react to these kinds
of advertisements.

STUDY 1
In study 1, we examined the relationship between a trait's
perceived relevance to self-identity and people's willingness
to enhance it. We selected 19 social, emotional, and cognitive traits, and we asked participants to imagine that a
pharmaceutical had been developed that could safely improve a person with respect to each trait. We correlated
participants' ratings of how relevant each trait is to selfidentity with (different) participants' willingness to take an
enhancing pharmaceutical to improve each trait. We expected a strong negative relationship across traits:
HI:

People will be less willing to enhance traits that
are more fundamental to the self.

Like most important decisions, we expect decisions about
enhancement to be multiply determined. However, while
other factors may playa role in people's reluctance to enhance themselves, we expected concerns about altering the
fundamental self to be dominant. To test this, we asked
participants to indicate their reasons for being reluctant to
enhance each trait. In addition to indicating reluctance because of not wanting to change their fundamental selves,
participants could indicate reluctance due to (1) concerns
about morality, (2) concerns about being affected in unexpected ways, and (3) general concerns about taking pills.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, we expected concern for
changing the fundamental selfto be the most frequently cited
reason for the reluctance to enhance, and we expected it to
be cited more for traits considered more fundamental to selfidentity.

Method
Participants and Design. Three hundred and fiftyseven undergraduates participated in an online study that
offered a lottery prize of $50. We used a between-subjects
design: some participants (n = 110) rated 19 traits according to how fundamental they are to a person's self-identity.
These participants were randomly assigned to one of three
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self-identity rating instructions ("inherence," "fundamental,"
or "authenticity," described below). We expected all three
ratings to tap into the same construct and to exhibit the same
relationship with participants' willingness to enhance. A different group of 247 participants was asked to indicate
whether they would take a pill to achieve each of the 19
enhancements (the "would-you-enhance" group).

Procedure and Materials. We selected 19 traits for
use in studies 1-3 (see table 1). Trait selection was inspired
by the bioethics literature on enhancement and was based
on the following criteria. First, we selected traits that are
psychological in nature and that reflect a range of social,
emotional, and cognitive abilities. Second, we selected traits
for which treatments already exist or are foreseeable (so
traits like "humor" were excluded). Third, because we were
uninterested in cases where the reluctance to enhance was
driven by participants' lack of interest in improving, we
selected traits that we believed many people would want to
improve. Fourth, we selected traits that could be described
in a very specific manner. Indeed, to ensure that all participants interpreted the traits in the same way, we provided
only very specific trait definitions (e.g., "ability to memorize
and remember rehearsed information" and "ability to relax
and avoid unnecessary worry and anxiety") instead of single-word trait descriptors such as "memory" or "relaxed."
Of the three self-identity rating instructions, the inherence measure was used by Haslam et al. (2004), and we
developed the fundamental and authenticity measures.
Participants receiving the inherence instructions were shown
a randomly ordered list of the 19 traits. For each trait,
they indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 =
"strongly disagree" and 7 = "strongly agree") with the
statement: "This characteristic is a deeply-rooted aspect

of a person: it lies deep within the person and underlies the
person's behavior" (Haslam et al. 2004).
Participants receiving the fundamental and authenticity
measures began by reading the following cover story about
enhancing pharmaceuticals:
There is an increasing public interest in what is called "pharmacological enhancement"-the
use of pharmaceuticals to
enhance the brain functioning of ordinary individuals. Normal, healthy people will be able to enhance specific aspects
of themselves without side effects. We would like your opinions about some of the enhancements that are expected to be
possible. In each case, assume that a new kind of prescription
pharmaceutical has been developed that can safely alter specific parts of the brain.
Think of these as a sort of magic pill. They only have to
be taken once and the effect is permanent. Imagine that the
pills are completely safe with no long-term or short-term side
effects. They only alter the specific part of the brain that they
target.

After reading the cover story, participants receiving the
fundamental instructions were asked to indicate "how much
each pill would fundamentally change 'who you are: For
example, if a person changes their hair color, they are NOT
fundamentally changing who they are. The changes that we
want you to consider will generally be more fundamental
than that." Below this instruction, the 19 enhancements were
presented (in a random order) in the following form: "A pill
that made me better at memorizing and remembering rehearsed information. . ." Participants rated each enhancement on a lO-point scale, ranging from 1 = "superficial
change in who I am" to 10 = "fundamental change in
who I am."

TABLE 1
TRAIT LABELS AND DESCRIPTIONS
Trait label
Absentmindedness
Concentration
Creativity
Emotional recovery
Empathy
Episodic memory
Foreign language ability
Kindness
Math ability
Mood
Motivation
Music ability
Reflexes
Relaxation
Rote memory
Self-confidence
Self-control
Social comfort
Wakefulness

Trait description
Ability to remember to do things and avoid absentmindedness
Ability to concentrate while reading or doing other mental tasks
Ability to think about problems creatively and in multiple ways
Ability to "get over" setbacks and traumas
Ability to recognize and empathize with other people's emotions
Ability to remember distant and recent life events
Ability to learn foreign languages
Tendency to act kindly toward others
Ability to understand and solve math problems
Average mood
Motivation to accomplish one's personal goals
Ability to learn and play music
Speed of reflexes and hand-eye coordination
Ability to relax and avoid unnecessary worry and anxiety
Ability to memorize and remember rehearsed information
Self-confidence and belief in oneself
Ability to exert self-control in deciding what to do and how to spend time
Tendency to feel comfortable when meeting new people
Ability to function effectively and comfortably with little sleep

NOTE.-Only the trait descriptions were presented to participants. The trait labels are the authors' shorthand labels for the traits and
were never presented.
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TABLE 2
STUDIES 1 AND 3: MEANS AND PERCENTAGES

Trait
Reflexes
Rote memory
Wakefulness
Foreign language ability
Math ability
Episodic memory
Concentration
Music ability
Absentm indedness
Self-control
Creativity
Emotional recovery
Relaxation
Social comfort
Motivation
Mood
Self-confidence
Empathy
Kindness
NOTE.- Traits

Identity index
(study 1)

% Willing to
enhance
(study 1)

% Willing to
enhance
(study 3)

% Favoring a
ban (study 3)

-1.23
-1.18
-1.13
-1.09
-1.01
-.99
-.76
-.69
-.58
.43
.54
.57
.66
.71
.86
.99
1.14
1.38
1.39

36
51
53
54
35
34
47
35
35
24
30
21
31
26
24
21
19
13
9

35
45
52
41
37
51
46
37
38
23
33
21
32
29
22
24
21
19
10

52
49
45
30
53
43
29
49
24
38
49
30
28
32
42
35
36
40
43

Moral
acceptability
(study 3)

5.5
5.9
6.4
6.0
5.7
7.3
6.4
5.7
7.2
6.4
5.8
6.5
7.1
6.7
6.1
6.7
6.5
6.4
6.5

are sorted in ascending order of identity relevance.

After reading the cover story, participants receiving the
authenticity instruction read the following: "In each case,
we would now like to know if you think that improving
yourself by taking pills would affect your authenticity. In
other words, do you think that you would in some way be
fake or inauthentic, as a result of the pills? Or would you
still be the 'real you' even if you improved through pills?"
Below this instruction, the 19 enhancements were presented
(in a random order) in the following form: "If a pill made
me better at memorizing and remembering rehearsed information ... " Participants rated each enhancement on a 10point scale, ranging from 1 = "I would still be the real
me" to 10 = "I would be fake/inauthentic."
Participants in the would-you-enhance group were not
asked to make any of the inherence, fundamental, or authenticity ratings. Instead, they indicated whether they would
consider taking a pill to make themselves better on each of
the 19 traits. The traits (e.g., "ability to memorize and remember rehearsed information") appeared in a random order,
and participants indicated one of three responses for each
trait:
1. I would take a pill to get better at this.
2. I wish 1 was better at this, but 1 would not take a pill.
3. I do not wish to be better at this.
After indicating their responses, participants were asked
to indicate the reason(s) for their reluctance to enhance each
of the traits. The list of possible reasons was developed by
exaruining open-ended responses in pilot studies and through
discussions with colleagµes. Since many participants were
not in fact resistant to enhancing, and many did not even
wish to be better on some traits, we included response op-

tions associated with those possibilities. The specific instruction for this task was as follows: "Even if you would
ultimately take the pill, you might still be at least a little
reluctant, and we would like to learn why. A short list of
reasons will be presented and you should indicate which
one best represents your reason for being reluctant to take
that particular pill. (You may select more than one reason
if need be.)"
The enhancements were then listed in a random order.
For each of the enhancements, the response options were
as follows (the order of options 3-5 was counterbalanced
between participants):
1. I am not at all reluctant to take this pill.
2. I am reluctant because I do not even wish to be better
on this trait.
3. I am reluctant because this is immoral.
4. I am reluctant because this might affect me in some
unexpected ways.
5. I am reluctant because this would fundamentally
change who I am.
6. I am reluctant because I just do not like taking pills.
7. I am reluctant for a reason that is not listed here.

Results and Discussion
Across traits, the three self-identity measures correlated
nearly perfectly, suggesting that these measures in fact assess the same construct. Inherence and fundamental ratings
correlated at .93, inherence and authenticity ratings correlated at .96, and fundamental and authenticity ratings correlated at .95 (p's < .001). For each trait, we averaged the
standardized scores of each rating, and we refer to this average as the "self-identity index." Table 2 displays the self-
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identity index for each trait, as well as the percentage of
participants in the would-you-enhance group who were in
fact willing to enhance. Half of the participants in the wouldyou-enhance group were told that the effects were reversible
rather than permanent. However, this manipulation had no
effect on the results, and so we collapsed across this variable
in the analyses presented here.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the self-identity index of
each enhancement negatively and strongly predicted the percentage of people who were willing to take the enhancement
(r(l7) = - .88, p < .001). This correlation remained highly
significant when we controlled for the percentage of people
who did not want to be better on the trait (r(l6) = -.76,
p < .001) and when we eliminated all "I do not wish to be
better at this" responses (r(l7) = -.89, p < .001).
To examine hypothesis 1 further, we analyzed the reasons
participants gave for being reluctant to enhance a particular
trait. Since participants had the option of indicating that they
were not in fact reluctant, we restricted the analysis to those
who checked one of the six reasons for being reluctant. As
shown in table 3, the most common reason given was concern that the enhancement would "fundamentally change
who I am" (41 %). Across traits, the percentage endorsing
this reason was significantly greater than the percentage endorsing any other reason (t's(17) > 2.90, p's < .009).
More important, people were more likely to endorse the
fundamentalness reason for more fundamental traits. Across
traits, the proportion of people expressing reluctance to enhance because of a concern for fundamentally "changing
who I am" correlated positively with the self-identity index
(r(17) = .93, p < .001). The self-identity index did not significantly positively correlate with the proportion of people
indicating resistance for any of the other reasons mentioned
(see table 3). This suggests that fundamental traits are not
those for which people perceive enhancements to produce
especially unintended consequences or that inspire a particularly strong moral concern or distaste for pills. In fact,
moral concerns were expressed more often for traits that are
considered less fundamental to self-identity.
In sum, study 1 provides strong evidence that the reluctance to fundamentally alter one's self-identity largely determines people's reluctance to enhance particular psychological traits. People are less willing to enhance traits that

are believed to be more fundamental to the self (e.g., motivation, social comfort) than traits that are less fundamental
to the self (e.g., memory ability, concentration), presumably
because they are reluctant to alter their own self-identities.

STUDIES 2A AND 2B
In study 2, we sought to rule out some potential alternative
explanations for the results of study 1. Toward that aim, we
examined whether people's reluctance to enhance fundamental versus nonfundamental traits is attributable not to
the hypothesized reluctance to change one's self-identity but
rather to one (or more) of the following explanations:
1.

Value: People are more willing to enhance less fundamental traits because they believe that these enhancements would better improve their lives.
2. Magnitude: People are more reluctant to enhance
more fundamental traits because they believe that
these enhancements would change more aspects of
their lives.
3. Unfairness: People are more reluctant to enhance
more fundamental traits because they believe that
these enhancements would give them more of an unfair advantage over others.
4. Self-possession: People are more reluctant to enhance
more fundamental traits because they believe that
they are already superior on these trait dimensions.
5. Effectiveness: People are more reluctant to enhance
more fundamental traits because they believe that
these enhancements are less effective or plausible.
Participants in studies 2a and 2b indicated their willingness to enhance the 19 traits, and they rated the fundamentalness of each enhancement. To reduce the number of ratings the participants had to make, we used only the fundamental rating instructions from study 1 to assess selfidentity. Across traits, this measure correlated at .98 with
the self-identity index of study 1. In keeping with the desire
to minimize the number of ratings required, we examined
the five alternative explanations in two separate studies. Accordingly, participants in study 2a also rated the enhancements on value, magnitude, and unfairness, and participants
in study 2b rated the traits on self-possession and the en-

TABLE 3
STUDY 1: PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE ENDORSING EACH REASON FOR THEIR
RELUCTANCE TO ENHANCE

Reason
I do not even wish to be better on this trait
This is immoral
This might affect me in some unexpected ways
This would fundamentally change who I am
I just do not like taking pills
A reason that is not listed here

%
25.6
13.7
29.4
40.8
19.6
15.8

Correlation with
self-identity index
.27
-.60*

-.21
.93*
-.76*
-.54*

*p< .05; participants were free to endorse more than one reason for their reluctance to enhance.

ENHANCEMENT PHARMACEUTICALS

hancements on effectiveness. Consistent with hypothesis 1,
we expected to observe a strong negative relationship between fundamentalness and the willingness to enhance particular traits, even after controlling for each of the variables
listed above.

Method
Participants and Design. One hundred and seventysix undergraduates participated in study 2a, and 90 undergraduates participated in study 2b. Both studies were administered as online surveys that offered lottery prizes worth
$60. Both studies used a within-subjects design.
Procedure and Materials. Study 2a used the same
cover story and traits as study 1. The survey consisted of
five sections. In section 1, participants indicated their willingness to enhance each trait, using the same measure as in
study 1. Section 2 featured the magnitude measure, and
participants indicated, for each enhancement pill, "how
many aspects of your life would be affected if you took
the pill yourself." Participants rated each enhancement
on a lO-point scale, ranging from 1 = "few aspects of
my life would be affected" to 10 = "all aspects of my
life would be affected." Section 3 featured the value measure, and participants were instructed "to indicate the extent
to which you think that your life as a whole would be better
if you were a little better on each trait." Each trait was
presented in the following form: "My life would be better
if I was better at memorizing and remembering rehearsed
information." Participants rated these statements on a 10point scale, ranging from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 10 =
"strongly agree." Section 4 featured the fundamentalness
measure, and participants indicated, for each enhancement
pill, "the extent to which each pill would fundamentally
change who you are." Participants rated each enhancement
on a lO-point scale, ranging from 1 = "superficial change
in who I am" to 10 = "fundamental change in who I
am." Finally, section 5 featured the "unfairness" measure,
and participants indicated "the extent to which taking each
pill would give you an unfair advantage over others." Participants rated these statements on a lO-point scale, ranging
from 1 = "not at all unfair" to 10 = "very unfair." Participants were randomly assigned to one of four survey orderings. The four orderings were achieved by counterbalancing the position of the willingness-to-enhance questions
(either first or last) and by counterbalancing the order of the
other four sections.
To examine whether our results are robust to different
methods of enhancement, study 2b described a slightly different cover story than the previous two studies. Specifically,
participants were told that the enhancement pills would have
to be taken once per day for 3 months in order for them to
be effective. However, all other aspects of the cover story
and procedure were identical to study 2a, and there was no
significant difference in rates of enhancement between studies 2a and 2b. The survey consisted offour sections. Section
1 featured the same willingness-to-enhance measure used in
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studies 1 and 2a. Section 2 featured the effectiveness measure, and participants indicated "the extent to which you
think scientists could potentially develop pills that have
these specific effects." Participants rated each trait on a 10point scale, ranging from 1 = "impossible to improve
with pills" to 10 = "possible to improve with pills." Section 3 featured the same fundamentalness rating used in
studies 1 and 2a. Section 4 featured the self-possession
rating, and participants were asked, for each trait, "How
do you compare to other people your age?" They rated
their own abilities on a lO-point scale, ranging from 1 =
"lower than everyone" to 10 = "higher than everyone."
The order of these sections was reversed for approximately
half of the participants.

Results and Discussion
Across traits, we regressed the percentage of participants
who were willing to enhance each trait on study 2a's (1)
mean value rating, (2) mean magnitude rating, (3) mean
fundamentalness rating, and (4) mean unfairness rating and
on study 2b's (5) mean self-possession rating and (6) mean
effectiveness rating. We conducted two regressions, one using study 2a's enhancement percentage and the other using
study 2b's enhancement percentage. Table 4 shows the results. As predicted, participants were less likely to enhance
traits that they considered to be fundamental to the self
(p's < .003). This was the only effect significant in both
regressions. The results were nearly identical when study
2a's enhancement percentages were regressed on only the
mean ratings obtained in study 2a (i.e., value, magnitude,
fundamentalness, and unfairness) and study 2b's enhancement percentages were regressed on only the mean ratings
obtained in study 2b (i.e., fundamentalness, self-possession,
and effectiveness).
The within-subjects design used in studies 2a and 2b permitted by-participant analyses as well. To accomplish this,
we computed, for each participant, the across-trait partial
correlation between the willingness to enhance and ratings
of how fundamental each trait was to the self (controlling
for the other variables measured in each study). We removed
participants whose responses to one of the critical measures
were identical across traits, as correlations could not be
calculated for these participants. And, for each participant,
we removed traits for which he or she responded "I do not
wish to be better" to the would-you-enhance question, because we were interested in predicting people's willingness
to artificially enhance traits that they wanted to improve.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the average within-subject
partial correlations between a participant's willingness to
enhance and the same participant's fundamental ness rating
were significantly negative in both studies (p's < .003; see
table 5).
In addition, using the same analytical procedure, willingness to enhance was significantly positively related to magnitude, unfairness, value, and effectiveness (see table 5).
Contrary to the alternative explanations suggested above,
when we controlled for the other measured variables, par-
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TABLE 4
STUDIES 2A AND 2B: ACROSS-TRAIT STANDARDIZED REGRESSION
COEFFICIENTS ({3) PREDICTING PARTICIPANTS' WILLINGNESS TO ENHANCE

Predictor

% Willing to enhance
(study 2a)

% Willing to enhance
(study 2b)

-1.00"
-.26
.92"
.27
-.03
-.10

-1.33"
-.05
.58
-.22
.16
-.07

Fundamentalness (study 2a)
Magnitude (study 2a)
Value (study 2a)
Unfairness (study 2a)
Effectiveness (study 2b)
Self-possession (study 2b)
"p<.05.

ticipants were more likely to enhance traits that altered more
aspects of themselves, as well as traits they perceived to
give them an unfair advantage. Not surprisingly, they were
also more likely to enhance traits that would make their
lives better and more likely to take enhancements that would
be more effective. Participants' willingness to enhance traits
did not depend on whether they believed they already possessed them.
Finally, in a separate study (N = 115), we examined another potential alternative explanation for people's reluctance to enhance fundamental traits: perhaps people are more
reluctant to enhance traits that they can change via more
natural means. In this study, participants indicated their
agreement with statements of the form: "If I wanted to, it
would be possible for me to get better at memorizing and
remembering rehearsed information, without resorting to
medications or other remedies." When we added this measure of "controllability" as a predictor in the regressions
reported above, it was not significant (p's > .18), and the
effect of fundamentalness remained highly significant (p's <
.005).
In sum, the results of study 2 reinforced the results of
study 1. People were less willing to artificially enhance fundamental traits, and the alternative explanations put forth
seem unable to account for this relationship.

STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 established that people are more reluctant
to enhance traits that are more fundamental to self-identity.

Indeed, the willingness to enhance particular aspects of one's
personality seems driven by the desire to improve oneself
without meaningfully changing the fundamental self.
Interestingly, the willingness to enhance seems not to be
driven predominantly by moral or fairness concerns. On the
surface, this seems at odds with research showing that people
morally object to the legalization of enhancement technologies (Baron and Spranca 1997; Sabini and Monterosso
2003, 2005). To reconcile this, we suggest that one's own
willingness to engage in enhancement is driven by different
concerns than is one's desire to ban legal access to particular
enhancements. Whereas people are more reluctant to take
enhancements that would alter their own identities, they may
not object to other people altering their identities. Indeed,
when judging the actions of others, people are much more
likely to invoke concerns for moral acceptability than they
are when judging their own actions (Diekmann et al. 1997).
Accordingly, although we expected moral concerns to play
little (if any) role in predicting people's own enhancement
preferences, we did expect such concerns to predict the enhancement restrictions that they wish to impose on others.
In study 3, we asked some people whether they would
be willing to take the various enhancement pills and asked
others whether they thought that the enhancement of each
trait should be banned. As in studies 1 and 2, we expected
fundamentalness, but not moral acceptability, to primarily
predict people's willingness to enhance. As in previous research (Baron and Spranca 1997; Sabini and Monterosso
2003, 2005), we expected moral acceptability, but not fun-

TABLE 5
STUDIES 2A AND 2B: MEAN WITHIN-SUBJECT

Measure
Fundamentalness (study 2a)
Magnitude (stUdy 2a)
Value (study 2a)
Unfairness (study 2a)
Fundamentalness (study 2b)
Effectiveness (study 2b)
Self-posseSSion (study 2b)

PARTIAL CORRELATIONS

Willing to enhance
(study 2a)

Willing to enhance
(study 2b)

-.13"
.11'
.23"
.05"
-.1?"
.1?"
.01

"p< .01; the partial correlations control for the other variables measured in each study.
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damentalness, to primarily predict the desire to ban particular enhancements. Because we expected different motivations to affect these two choices, we also expected responses
to the two questions to be only modestly correlated.
H2:

Unlike people's willingness to enhance, people's
desire to ban legal access to enhancements will
be driven more by moral concerns than by concerns about fundamentally altering the self.

Method
Participants and Design. Three hundred and fifty-nine
undergraduates participated in an online study that offered
a lottery prize of $50. We used a between-subjects design.
One group (n = 113) indicated their willingness to enhance
each trait ("would-you-enhance" group), a second group
(n = 110) indicated whether the enhancement of each trait
should be banned ("banning" group), and a third group
(n = 136) rated the fundamentalness and moral acceptability of each enhancement ("fundamental/moral" group).
Procedure and Materials.
We used the same 19 traits
as in studies 1 and 2 and the same cover story about pharmaceutical enhancements described in study 1. Using the
same method as in study 1, participants in the would-youenhance group indicated which, if any, enhancements they
would consider taking. Participants in the banning group
indicated "whether or not you think that use of the pill should
be banned for enhancement purposes, that is, for people who
are near average or above average on the particular trait."
Their response options were "Yes, such a pill should be
banned for enhancement purposes" and "No, such a pill
should not be banned for enhancement purposes." Participants in the fundamental/moral group were asked to imagine
that a person who is already average on the given trait
becomes significantly above average by taking the pharmaceutical. Similar to the instructions in study 1, they were
then asked to imagine how much each enhancement would
fundamentally change "who the person is" on a 10-point
scale, ranging from 1 = "superficial change in who the
person is" to 10 = "fundamental change in who the
person is." These participants also rated the moral acceptability of each of the enhancements on a lO-point scale,
ranging from 1 = "not at all morally acceptable" to 10 =
"completely morally acceptable." The order of fundamental
and morality questions was counterbalanced, and for all participants in this study the order of enhancements was randomly presented.

Results and Discussion
The percentage of people willing to enhance each trait
was very consistent with the previous studies (average
r(17) = .88, p < .001). However, as shown in table 2, there
was considerable variance across traits in the willingness to
take and ban enhancements: some trait enhancements were
appealing for one's own use but were frequently opposed
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for use by others. Conversely, some enhancements were less
appealing for one's own use but were infrequently opposed
for others' use.
The willingness to enhance and the desire to ban legal
access to the enhancements were not significantly correlated
(r(17) = - .19, P = .61). Consistent with the reasons analysis in study 1, when willingness to enhance was regressed
on the moral acceptability and fundamentalness ratings,
fundamentalness was a significant predictor ({3 = - .92,
p < .001), but moral acceptability was not (f3 = .004, p>
.96). However, consistent with hypothesis 2, when the desire
to ban legal access to the enhancements was regressed on
these same two predictors, the exact opposite result was
observed: moral acceptability was a strongly significant predictor ({3 = - .90, p < .001), but fundamentalness was not
({3 = - .03, p > .77).
These results provide strong support for the hypothesized
dissociation between the decision to enhance one's own
traits and the decision to ban others' access to those enhancements. Whereas the former is largely determined by
concerns about altering the fundamental self, the latter is
largely determined by moral concerns. The strong relationship between banning and moral acceptability is important,
because it suggests that our measurement of moral acceptability is valid and that there is meaningful variance in this
variable across traits. This means that the null relationship
we observed between moral acceptability and the willingness to enhance cannot be attributed to poor measurement
but rather to the truly small (or null) relationship between
these variables.

STUDY 4
The results of studies 1-3 suggest that people are more
resistant to enhancing traits that they believe to be fundamental to self-identity. In study 4, we examined the implications of this finding for advertising. Direct-to-consumer
advertising of psychoactive pharmaceuticals has been controversial, and all stakeholder groups (patients, physicians,
policy makers, industry) have an interest in understanding
how people react to these advertisements. We hypothesized
that interest in enhancing fundamental traits could be increased through marketing messages that are framed so as
to reduce the threat that enhancing fundamental traits poses
to self-identity.
In study 4, we presented participants with advertisements
for a hypothetical enhancement pharmaceutical (Zeltor),
which was described as improving a trait that was high
(social comfort) or low (ability to concentrate) in fund amentalness. We manipulated the tagline associated with Zeltor, and we asked participants to rate their interest in trying
the drug. In the enhancement condition, the tagline suggested that taking the drug would enhance people's true
selves. In the enablement condition, the tagline suggested
that taking the drug would enable people to realize their
true selves (Lynch 2006, forthcoming).
Because studies 1-3 suggested that people are more willing to enhance traits that are less fundamental to self-iden-
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tity, we expected participants in the enhancement condition
to show more interest in enhancing concentration (a relatively nonfundamental trait, with an identity index score of
-.76 in study 1) than social comfort (a relatively fundamental trait, with an identity index score of .71 in study 1).
Moreover, if people are less willing to take a drug to enhance
social comfort (vs. concentration) precisely because so doing
imposes a greater threat to the self, then an enablement
tagline that minimizes this threat to the self should increase
participants' willingness to take the social comfort drug and
thereby reduce the difference in their relative preference for
the concentration drug. Thus, consistent with our claim that
concerns about preserving self-identity are critical in determining people's across-trait enhancement preferences, we
expected participants in the enablement condition to show
a more equal interest in enhancing concentration versus social comfort.
H3:

People's relative preference for enhancing less
fundamental versus more fundamental traits will
be diminished when a drug's tagline frames it
as an enabler of the true self rather than as an
enhancer of the true self.

Method
Participants and Design. Five hundred participants,
ages 18-45 years, completed an online survey that offered
a chance to win a $35 gift certificate. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (more
fundamental vs. less fundamental trait) x 2 (enhancement
vs. enablement tagline) between-subjects design.
Procedure and Materials.
Participants began by reading an introductory paragraph about an enhancement drug
named Zeltor. For example, participants in the less fundamental/enhancement condition read the following:
Within the next 5-10 years, pharmaceuticalcompanies are
planningto introducedrugsthatare designedto allownormal,
healthy individualsto improve themselvesin various ways.
It is believedthat one of the most popularof these new drugs
will be designed to improve people's ability to concentrate
while reading or doing other mental tasks.
In this study, we are interested in which sorts of concentration drugs will be the most popular. One such drug is
known as Zeltor,and its manufacturerspromisethat the drug
has no side effects and that its effects will not be permanent.
The tagline for Zeltor will be "ZeJtor-Become More Than
Who You Are."
Participants in the more fundamental trait condition were
told that Zeltor was designed to improve people's ability to
feel more comfortable when meeting new people (instead
of concentration), a trait that people in all of our studies
indicated as being highly fundamental to the self. The tagline
manipulation involved only a slight change in the wording
of the ad's tagline. The enhancement tagline read, "Zel-

tor-Become More Than Who You Are," whereas the enablement tagline read, "Zeltor-Become Who You Are."
After reading the description of Zeltor, participants answered two questions: (1) "Assuming that the drug truly has
no side effects, to what extent would you be interested in
increasing your concentration [social comfort] by using a
drug like Zeltor?" and (2) "To what extent would you be
interested in trying Zeltor at least once?" Participants gave
their responses on 9-point scales ranging from 1 == "not
at all interested" to 9 == "extremely interested."

Results and Discussion
Responses to the two dependent measures were highly
correlated (r( 498) == .89), and so we averaged them before
conducting the analyses. A 2 (trait) x 2 (tagline) betweensubjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of trait
(FO,496) == 5.26, p < .03) as well as a significant interaction between trait and tagline (F(l,496) == 4.07, P <
.05). As shown in figure 1, participants who read the enhancement tagline were more interested in the concentration
drug than in the social comfort drug (t(254) == 3.01, P ==
.003). This replicates the results of studies 1-3, which found
that participants were less willing to enhance more fundamental than less fundamental traits. However, consistent
with hypothesis 3, this effect was reduced for participants
who encountered the enablement tagline, and they were not
more interested in the concentration drug than the social
comfort drug (t(242) == .20, p > .84). Looked at differently,
the results show that the enablement tagline increased interest in the social comfort drug (t(250) == 1.77, P < .08)
but not the concentration drug (t(246) == -1.08, p > .28).
These results have both theoretical and practical implications. On the theoretical side, these results lend further
support to our claim that across-trait differences in people's
willingness to enhance are largely governed by concerns
about altering one's fundamental self-identity. When a tagline framed drugs as enablers instead of enhancers, we expected participants to view pharmaceutical improvements to
fundamental traits as less threatening to their fundamental
self. Thus, we expected and found that the enablement tagline increased interest in taking an identity-relevant social
comfort drug but did not increase people's interest in taking
an identity-irrelevant concentration drug. As a result, the
relative preference for concentration over social comfort
drugs-a preference observed in studies 1-3-significantly
decreased when the drug was described in a way that was
less threatening to self-identity. This finding helps to isolate
the role of identity concerns in across-trait differences in
participants' willingness to enhance, particularly because
other differences between the traits (e.g., desirability, controllability, self-possession, fairness) were held constant
across the enhancement and enablement conditions.
On the practical side, these results suggest ways in which
advertisers can reduce the identity concerns that would otherwise prevent nonclinical populations from seeking an enhancement pharmaceutical. Indeed, people seem reluctant
to enhance traits that are fundamental to self-identity unless
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FIGURE 1

STUDY 4: INTEREST IN ENHANCING AS A FUNCTION OF TRAIT AND TAGLINE
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advertisers pitch such enhancements as enabling rather than
altering self-identity.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In an effort to understand the psychology underlying the
demand for enhancement pharmaceuticals, we hypothesized
that people would be more reluctant to enhance aspects of
themselves that they consider to be fundamental to selfidentity. In three studies, we found that this was indeed the
case. Enhancements that were independently evaluated as
being more fundamental to the self were the ones that people
were most reluctant to take (studies 1-3), and concern for
changing the fundamental self was the most frequently cited
reason for resisting enhancement (study 1). Furthermore, the
relationship between traits' fundamentalness and the willingness to enhance was robust to controls for the enhancements' perceived value, magnitude, effectiveness, morality,
and unfairness and for the traits' self-possession and perceived controllability (study 2). It seems that people are
reluctant to take fundamental enhancements primarily because they are reluctant to fundamentally change their selfidentities.
Although people were not more willing to take enhancements that were more morally acceptable, moral acceptability did predict people's policy preferences. People were
more inclined to ban enhancements that were morally unacceptable. This result has implications for both marketing
managers and regulators. Notably, because policy preferences and consumption preferences may be, at best, only
modestly correlated (study 3), practitioners may need to craft
different communication appeals depending on whether their
goal is to influence support for legalization policies or to
influence consumer demand. Specifically, appeals that emphasize moral concerns may be most effective for influenc-

ing policy support, whereas appeals that emphasize identity
concerns may be most effective for influencing consumer
demand.
In study 4, we found that by framing enhancements as
enablers of one's true self, advertisers can successfully disarm the identity concerns that would otherwise prevent nonclinical individuals from enhancing a fundamental trait. In
this light, it is interesting to consider the case of Paxil, an
antidepressant sold by GlaxoSmithKline. Paxil has used the
tagline "Paxil gets you back to being you" on its Web site.
This tagline can, appropriately, ease the concerns of clinically depressed and anxious individuals who are considering
taking this potentially helpful medication. At the same time,
our research suggests that it could also increase the inclination of nonclinical individuals to seek a Paxil prescription
for self-improvement purposes. It is for regulators (as well
as for industry and consumer welfare groups) to decide if
anything should be done about this. It is our role as market
researchers to inform their decisions by uncovering the psychological mechanisms underlying consumer demand for
this increasingly powerful and available product category.
We consider our research to be a starting point in the
investigation of people's decisions to enhance their psychological abilities. In what follows, we discuss some of the
many unanswered questions that remain.
First, relatively little is known about how people form
beliefs about which traits define a person's fundamental selfidentity. Using several different measures, we found considerable across-trait variance in which traits are believed
to be fundamental to self-identity. Though the split is not
perfect, it seems that our participants believe that social and
emotional abilities are fundamental to self-identity, whereas
more cognitive abilities are less fundamental. This finding
is consistent with research by Haslam et al. (2004), who
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found that a trait's emotionality was correlated with its inherence (one of the measures composing our identity index
in study 1). However, despite our findings, it is still not clear
which variables affect people's conception of the fundamental self, nor is it clear whether the distinction between
cognition and emotion plays a causal role in governing beliefs about identity. Indeed, understanding the factors affecting beliefs about identity is an important topic for future
research, especially because knowing what affects these beliefs may provide researchers and practitioners with ways
to alter them. As our findings suggest, changing beliefs about
which aspects of the self are fundamental is likely to affect
people's willingness to take psychological enhancements.
A second question concerns how people's beliefs about
their own capabilities might affect their desire to enhance
themselves. It is possible that people who perceive themselves as worse than they "should be" on some trait dimension are more likely to enhance that trait in an effort to
become "who they really are." As one illustration of this
phenomenon, consider Kramer's (1993) very interesting
discussion of a depressed patient who needed "Prozac in order to 'feel [like] herself,'" a puzzling development that
prompted Kramer to ask, "Might [the patient], absent the
invention of the modern antidepressant, have lived her whole
life-a successful life, perhaps, by external standards-and
never been herself?" (19). Future research should try to
understand the conditions under which fundamental trait
enhancements will be seen as a means by which the true
self can be realized rather than altered. Indeed, even young,
healthy individuals may be willing to enhance fundamental
traits if they believe that those enhancements will make them
as good as but no better than they think they ought to be.
Shifting reference points or standards of comparison may
effectively alter whether people believe that they are better
or worse than they should be and may alter their preferences
for fundamental enhancements.
A third question relates to segmentation in the drug enhancement market. In this article, we have focused on college-age adults, in part because they are likely to be heavily
targeted by companies marketing enhancement products.
However, the preferences of older adults may be quite different, especially because they may have experienced the
development or decline of certain traits in their lifetimes.
People may be very willing to enhance traits on which they
used to be better, even if the traits are fundamental and the
decline has been natural. In such cases, people may view
some enhancement pharmaceuticals as enablers of a past but
truer self, and they may be more willing to take such enhancements as a result. Indeed, as technologies develop,
older adults may come to feel entitled to certain enhancements, thus putting further pressure on health care providers
and insurers.
Another unexplored issue is the role of culture. Cultures
that place less value on personal identity (Markus and Kitayama 1991) or that view personalities as more malleable
(Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1997) may be less likely to resist
altering the self in fundamental ways or may hold less stable
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beliefs about what constitutes the fundamental self. Alternatively, such cultures may dislike the heavy emphasis on
the self that is evoked by psychological enhancement products and thus be more likely to resist them.
Open questions also pertain to other self-improvement
products that are on the market. For example, many "natural" supplements are sold over the counter as cognitive and
emotional enhancers, and although their effectiveness is
highly questionable (Silver 2006), they are very popular
(Bolton et al. 2008). Mental training techniques such as yoga
and meditation are also popular as forms of cognitive and
emotional enhancement (and evidence of their effectiveness
is more compelling; Lutz et al. 2004). It is possible that
when self-improvement can be achieved through more "natural" means, people may feel that the threat to self-identity
is minimized and that the self is being enabled rather than
enhanced. This would suggest that the pattern of enhancement preferences that we found with pharmaceuticals may
be somewhat diminished when people contemplate what
they perceive to be more natural forms of self-improvement.
Indeed, we have found some preliminary evidence for this
(Simmons, Goodwin, and Riis 2008). In one study, we
manipulated both whether enhancements were achieved
through a pill regimen or through a "mental training" regimen and whether the respective regimens would improve
more fundamental traits or less fundamental traits. We found
both main effects and a significant interaction. People preferred enhancement with training to enhancement with pills,
and they preferred enhancement of less fundamental traits
to enhancement of more fundamental traits. More important,
the preference for enhancing less fundamental versus more
fundamental traits was significantly smaller in the mental
training conditions (70.5% vs. 55.4%) than in the pill conditions (4l.5% vs. 16.2%). This effect may arise because
fundamental enhancements are seen as less identity-altering
when the enhancements require a seemingly more natural
effort or training component. However, this interpretation is
speculative, and future research on this topic is needed.
Enhancements that require effort may not only be more
palatable to individuals themselves, but they may be deemed
more socially or morally acceptable as well. The moral acceptability of enhancement varied greatly by trait in study
3. If effort was required for the enhancement, this variance
may be diminished. As one reviewer pointed out to us,
enhancement pills that produce unpleasant side effects may
be considered more morally acceptable, since the individual
is clearly incurring a cost to receive the benefit. Again, this
is an area for future investigation.
In this article, we have focused on psychological as opposed to physical enhancements. However, many forms of
physical enhancements are available (e.g., growth hormone,
steroids, Propecia, Viagra, and cosmetic surgery), and we
expect that people will resist more fundamental changes in
the physical domain as well. However, it is likely that many
people feel that some of their physical features prevent them
feeling and appearing like their "true selves," in which case
many physical enhancements may be taken as enablers.
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We also have not discussed the emerging opportunities
for the genetic selection of children through diagnostic tests,
egg and sperm donation, and surrogate mothers (Spar 2006).
The opportunity for parents to make these choices will increase rapidly with advances in genetic research. It is possible that concern for an unborn child's identity would influence the choices that parents make. For example, parents
may be more reluctant to endow their children with genes
that alter traits and characteristics that are more fundamental
to the self.
In closing, we must point out that although our investigation has focused primarily on understanding
how selfidentity concerns affect people's preferences for enhancement pharmaceuticals,
it is clear that the impact of selfidentity concerns extends well beyond self-improvement
products. People adopt a wide variety of products for the
purpose of expressing their self-identities (Aaker 1999; Belk
1988; Shavitt et al. 1992), and they are likely to forgo previously chosen products when this identity function is no
longer being met (Berger and Heath 2007). Consumers'
choices are also strongly influenced by salient aspects of
their identities (LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Belyavsky 2007). Together, this research converges to highlight the importance
of identity expression and preservation
in governing the
choices and lives of consumers.
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